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Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) is a new concept under
development by the Marine Corps. OMFTS is a warfighting concept that revises the way
combat power is projected in littoral regions in that it uses the sea as a maneuver space
and safe haven for logistics, while further adopting ship to objective operations. Sea-
Based Logistics (SBL) uses the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ships to provide a sea-
base from which combat forces ashore are directly sustained. To function in this new
capacity, the ARG units need replenishment to maintain high stockage levels of fuel,
ammunition, and stores. This thesis develops a computer simulation for modeling the




The reader is cautioned that the computer program developed in this research may
not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, within
the time available, to ensure that the program is free from computational and logical
errors, it cannot be considered validated. Any application of this program without
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...From the Sea and Forward ...From the Sea define a new approach to projecting
Naval Power. This new approach is of strategic significance since it emphasizes littoral
operations and provides a link between maneuver warfare and naval warfare. This
approach further serves as the foundation for Operational Maneuver From the Sea
(OMFTS), a concept being developed by the U.S. Marine Corps. The goal ofOMFTS is
to break from the traditional two-phase ship to shore to objective movement and
transition to a one-phase ship to objective concept. [Ref 1]
Converting the OMFTS strategic concept into an operational reality requires
modification of current doctrinal and tactical practices. Decision makers must be capable
of merging their warfighting knowledge with technologically advanced support systems to
complete the combat equation. Once fully implemented, warfighters will soon benefit
from the advantages of speed, mobility, and focused logistics that OMFTS has to offer.
A crucial part ofOMFTS is the philosophy of "sea-basing" logistics. Sea-Based
Logistics (SBL) uses Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) ships to provide a sea-base from
which combat forces ashore are directly sustained. One clear advantage of SBL is the
elimination of a costly, vulnerable, and manpower-intensive shore-based logistics
infrastructure. Rather than incrementally building up a logistics stockpile ashore, SBL
uses over-the-horizon delivery vehicles to provide a more adaptable and secure
replenishment option to the landing force commander. With SBL, the landing force
commander has the flexibility of taking to shore only those items that are critical during
the first phases of the operation and replenishing as needed from an existing sea-base. If
needed, the landing force commander can respond more rapidly as changing situations
dictate the need to move or maneuver to a different objective area.
OMFTS and SBL are ideal for situations that lack modern port facilities or secured
airfields, as well as navigable waters that allow for safe offload of Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships. For example, contrast the sealift operations at
Mogadishu, Somalia in 1992 to those in Operation Desert Storm two years earlier. The
U.S. and other allied nations were allowed an unopposed six month buildup of forces
during the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia provided substantial Host Nation Support (HNS) for
coalition forces. Allies were able to offload and assemble war material at modern well-
managed port facilities located significant distances away from hostilities. In contrast,
Somalia lacked both suitable port facilities and civil authority. With no host nation
assistance available, the MPF ships were relied upon to transport all requirements into
theater in order to support the mission. Along with inadequate port facilities, military
planners were confronted with extreme tidal conditions and inaccurate depth sounding
data which further hampered the safe offload of critical MPF equipment. Though Restore
Hope and Desert Storm are dissimilar in scale, Somalia appears to be the more likely
template for events in the future. [Ref 4] Somalia would have been q suitable scenario
for SBL. The establishment of a sea-base for logistical sustainment of troops operating
ashore would have compensated for the lack of port facilities and HNS.
With the uncertainty of the locations of future conflicts, deployed Marine units
must remain flexible to changing threats and be capable of executing a variety of
operations in areas providing little or no HNS. Current plans require U.S. military forces
to support two near-simultaneous Major Theater Wars (MTW). The MTW scenarios are
the focus of many planning efforts. However, there are still numerous third world nations
whose instabilities have kept our military involved in Small Scale Conflict (SSC)
operations. Some examples of SSC include: disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,
peacekeeping, aid in assisting disaster victims, non-combatant evacuation operations, and
other related operations short of war. [Ref. 2&3]
Most SSC operations will occur in the littoral regions of the world. Combat forces
should assume that there will be no forward bases, little infrastructure and little or no HNS
in the area of operations. Small mobile Marine forces that are part of an expeditionary
force are likely candidates for most SSC operations and for utilizing sea-based assets for
sustainment. Expeditionary operations will involve the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF). Perhaps the most likely size of MAGTF to implement OMFTS is the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)). The MEU (SOC)
embarked aboard the ships of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) are capable of rapidly
responding to any crisis on short notice within their area of operation.
With OMFTS, the ARG will function as a sea-base, as well as a warehouse and
distribution center for Marine logistics. A new secondary function for the ARG is to serve
as an intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) for Marine ground equipment. Each ARG
possesses organic capability to transport supplies from its inventory directly to the forces
operating ashore. Platforms such as the CH-46, CH-53 and, eventually, the new MV-22
Osprey will transport supplies and field service assets from the ARG ships directly to the
objective area ashore. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles will also play a role in
SBL, but its movement is limited to the beach area ashore; air or ground lift assets must
provide the additional transfer of supplies inland.
It takes substantial coordination with the units of the ARG to maneuver close
enough to the objective area for the transport assets to deliver material to the shore. The
ARG has an even more limited capability in transporting some commodities such as
Supply Class III bulk fuel 1 . A recent thesis by LT Mark Beddoes [Ref. 5] determined the
constraints on the distance between the ARG and the objective area. Figure 1 depicts the
concept of SBL with the ARG serving as a sea-base for Marine forces ashore.
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Figure 1. Concept of Sea-Based Logistics
See Appendix A for an explanation of Supply Classes
The ARG normally deploys with enough supplies to sustain the MEU(SOC) for 15
days of operations with no external support. For the ARG to function as a logistics base,
the ARG units need replenishment in order to maintain high levels of Marine specific
supplies and services. Ships of the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) normally provide
replenishment for Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) and very limited support for ARG's.
Currently there are no CLF assets earmarked for supporting an ARG in a sea-based
logistics role.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS
The objective of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the ARG's role
as a sea-base for Marines, monitor supply levels for Marine forces ashore and replenish as
needed, and to quantify the requirement for CLF support to the ARG.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter II an overview of
sea-based logistics is provided. In Chapter III, the OMFTS Simulation Model is
described, followed by results in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V gives conclusions and
recommendations.
H. OVERVIEW OF SEA-BASED LOGISTICS
The essence offlexibility is in the mind ofthe commander; the
substance offlexibility is in logistics. (RADM Henry Eccles)
This chapter provides descriptions of a MEU(SOC) and an ARC At the
conclusion of this chapter, the reader will have gained an understanding of how each of
these components must collaborate to provide logistical support for sea-based logistics.
A. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE)
MEU(SOC))
The MEU is an expeditionary intervention force with the ability to move
quickly on short notice, to wherever needed to accomplish conventional or
special operations. The strength of the MEU (Special Operations Capable)
resides in the inherent combined arms capability while operating from
amphibious shipping, forward deployed. (U. S. Marine Corps, 11 th MEU, 1997).
The MEU serves as the "911" force for the National Command Authority in many
situations, particularly SSC in the littorals as mentioned previously. There are seven
standing MEU(SOC)s maintained by the USMC. Each embarks on an ARG with 15-days
of sustainability across several classes of supply. A MEU(SOC) consists of a Command
Element (CE), an Air Combat Element (ACE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), and a
Combat Service Support Element (CSSE). A detailed description of each component is
given in Ref. 6. This thesis focuses on the GCE of the MEU(SOC), namely the Battalion
Landing Team (BLT). The CE, ACE and CSSE all work cooperatively, oftentimes in
support of the BLT.
The BLT contains approximately 1406 personnel composed of an infantry
battalion and reinforced with an artillery battery, amphibious assault vehicle company,
combat engineers detachment, light armored reconnaissance company, an M1A1 Main
Battle Tank platoon, a reconnaissance platoon and other smaller attachments as required.
This composition makes the BLT a highly mobile and combat ready assault force, capable
of performing a variety of missions. For example, the BLT may be tasked with the seizure
of an airfield in order to allow the establishment of a noncombai evacuation site for
personnel. Other missions may include assistance to disaster relief victims. Due to its size
and mission, the BLT is the dominating component of the MEU (SOC). [Ref. 19]
B. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP (ARG)
"Amphibious Warfare is a method of combat in which an attack is launched from
the sea by naval and landing forces... special vessels are used to carry large numbers of
troops and equipment to hostile shores." [Ref 21]
Amphibious tactics of today require the use of high-speed lift assets that are
capable of rapidly moving forces to an objective area. Modern amphibious shipping is
capable of launching helicopters and discharging loaded landing craft from a flooded well
deck.
The ARG provides the necessary transportation for the MEU(SOC)'s personnel
and equipment from the point of embarkation to the designated operating area. The ARG
usually consists of three ships, namely an amphibious assault ship (LHD) or (LHA), a
dock landing ship (LSD), and a amphibious transport dock ship (LPD).
The LHD or LHA houses the CE for amphibious operations. It serves as the
primary aviation platform for the ACE and is capable of launching Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC) vehicles, and conventional landing craft to move Marine forces ashore.
The LPD is used to transport supplies to the objective area horizontally by embarked
landing craft and vertically by air assets. The LSD has the largest LCAC capacity of all
amphibious ships for troops and equipment transport. Its primary mission is to support
horizontal insertion over the shore. All of the ships listed above will carry some
component of the embarked MEU (SOC) and their supporting equipment.
It is also important to note that the LHD or LHA and the LSD carry the standard
package of supply classes I, III, IV and V(W) for Landing Force Operational Reserve
Material (LFORM). LFORM is a package of contingency supplies prepositioned on
amphibious ships consisting of Class I (Rations), Class III (Trioxane), Class III (W),
Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL), Class IV (Field Fortification Material), and Class V
(W) (Ground Ammunition). LFORM is part of the Marine Corps Prepositioned War
Reserve Material Stocks (PWRMS). LFORM is used to enhance logistics response time
and provide more timely support for embarked troops in contingencies. [Ref. 7]
With the reader introduced to the basic components and forces involved, the
remaining sections of this chapter will discuss how the pieces must interact to provide
SBL for the concept of OMFTS.
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
In traditional amphibious operations, ARG ships were used for a one time offload
of Marine logistics. Once the ARG offloaded, ARG units maintained a safe distance
offshore until the Marine forces returned from the assault. A logistics base ashore was
constructed by the Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) to handle large amounts of fuel,
ammunition, and other supplies received from the ARG. This base, also known as the
Beach Support Area (BSA) provided a central point for both the distribution and
management of logistic resupply materials for the forces operating ashore.
The BSA was maintained by members of the CSSE, and could be expanded to a
much larger Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) to handle additional material.
Establishing the BSA was time consuming and very labor intensive. Also, due to its
immobile nature, the CSSA was susceptible to attack and had to be heavily defended.
Current OMFTS doctrine relies on SBL, thereby eliminating the need to establish
a BSA or CSSA. The ultimate goal with SBL is to make amphibious operations seamless
across the battlefield so that there is no interruption in force movement or sustainment
from ship to objective area. Lift assets will transport resupply materials from the ARG
directly to the forces ashore. With sea-based logistics, the commander ashore has the
flexibility of taking only what he needs and then replenishing from the ARG ships as
necessary. Here the advantages are increased mobility, less excess, and a reduced overall
footprint. However, these types of operations may impose constraints on the lift assets
and ships of the ARG and incur some risk. In addition, if the ARG is to serve as a sea-
based warehouse to support forces ashore, the ARG units will need replenishment.
D. REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
In keeping with the Navy's tradition, fleet units must be capable of remaining at
sea for prolonged periods of time. Logistics support for fleet units is received by means
of underway replenishment (UNREP). The transfer of liquid and/or solid cargo between
two ships underway is an UNREP. [Ref. 15] Ships of the combat logistics force (CLF)
are equipped to replenish combatants underway for sustained periods of time.
Today, UNREP sustains a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) anywhere, anytime for as






Figure 2. UNREP Sustains CVBG
A carrier battle group (CVBG) normally deploys with 4-5 escort ships for a six
month duration. As part of the CVBG, a CLF multi-product replenishment ship keeps the
carrier and escorts stocked with fuel, ammunition/ordnance, consumable stores, and spare
parts. This CLF multi-product ship serves as a "station ship" for the CVBG. The CVBG
station ship is capable of delivering ammunition and stores through vertical replenishment
or by cargo transfer stations, while simultaneously transferring fuel.
When the CVBG station ship needs replenishment, CLF "shuttle ships", which are
not organic parts of the CVBG, bring supplies from forward logistic bases (FLB's) to the
CVBG station ship. CLF shuttle ships are single product ships, such as fleet oilier ships
(T-AO), ammunition ships (T-AE), and combat stores ships (T-AFS). In the event that a
CLF multi-product station ship is not available for a CVBG, a T-AO and T-AE both will
normally serve as station ships for the CVBG.
With the CVBG station ship providing logistic support for the CVBG, combatant
escort ships can maintain station in a combat role, while minimizing time awaiting
supplies. Similarly, UNREP of the ARG will allow the ARG ships to remain on station
and continue to support Marine forces operating ashore. Even if operations ashore do not
exceed 15 days, the ARG ships will need replenishment in certain classes of supply.
This thesis will examine the requirements to replenish the ARG ships from CLF
shuttle ships. CLF shuttle ships that normally service a CVBG may need to reconfigure
their cargo spaces to carry required levels of fuel, ammunition and stores needed for
Marine units. Once shuttle ships replenish the ARG ships, the ARG ships can deliver fuel
and cargo ashore with available transportation assets. CLF ships are not capable of
delivering supplies ashore.
Having presented the basic concept of Sea-Based Logistics, the following chapter
describes the simulation model developed to study it.
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HL THE OMFTS SIMULATION MODEL
Many systems are highly complex, so that valid mathematical rrodels
ofthem are themselves complex, precluding any possibility ofan
analytical solution. In this case, the model must be studied by means
ofsimulation (Law and Kelton, 1991).
A. THE PURPOSE OF THE MODEL
The OMFTS Simulation Model (OSM) models the logistical operations of an ARG
functioning as a sea-based warehouse and distribution center for Marine forces ashore.
The simulation was not intended to model combat operations ashore, but simply to
examine the logistical operations necessary to support OMFTS. The model is implemented
in Modular Simulation, Version II (MODSIM II), an object-oriented, modular, block-
structured programming language that provides synchronous and asynchronous discrete
event simulation. Appendix B discusses the controlling properties of each of the different
modules developed for the OSM.
B. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
The main objective of Sea-Based Logistics is to support the forces on shore.
Consequently, the primary Measures of Effectiveness (MOE's) for OSM are the average
on-shore levels for each of the supply classes considered. The classes are considered
separately because they are essentially incomparable. On the other hand, supplies are
aggregated by class because there are too many distinct items. For example Supply Class
V(W) contains approximately 100 different items with different characteristics such as
usage rates and quantity. OSM allows the user to observe the characteristics of the supply
class as a whole, vice analyzing observations of each supply item separately from the
others.
The inventory levels are averaged over time (i.e. the mean values are time-
averages) by dividing the cumulative area under the inventory level curve by the amount of
time. For the sake of measurement, the inventory levels are assumed to be piecewise
linear.
Thus, the primary MOEs capture the ability of Sea-Based Logistics to maintain
average inventory levels on shore. There may be, however other factors that are
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important. For example, the minimum inventory level over the campaign may be an
important consideration, since supplies that are short during a critical phase of the
campaign may adversely affect the outcome regardless of the average levels.
Finally, the inventory levels at the ARG are also a consideration. To evaluate the
ARG's ability to support the Marines, the average inventories of each supply class at the
ARG is measured. Apart from high levels at the ARG supporting the Marines better,
maintaining high ARG levels can also be a factor in case of unforeseen circumstances. An
unanticipated battle or a campaign that is longer than anticipated may require greater
inventory levels. Higher levels at the ARG help enable such contingencies. Each supply
class's average level at the ARG is measured, with the time averages being computed in
the same manner as the shore inventory levels.
C. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
OSM makes the following modeling assumptions:
• The FLB has unlimited stockage of needed commodities. Since the focus of
this thesis is about the ARG functioning as a sea-base, this assumption is
reasonable. Modeling the FLB is beyond the scope of this thesis. However the
simulation model is sufficiently flexible that the FLB could be readily
incorporated.
• All CLF shuttle ships are multi-product with identical characteristics. Multi-
product ships are able to replenish the ARG with fuel, ammunition and stores.
Otherwise the ARG must wait for an available single-product shuttle ship for
replenishment, while in the mean time she may be below safety stock levels in
other commodities.
• Shuttle ships consider the ARG as one unit. The justification for this
assumption is for model simplicity. In real-world situations, shuttle ships must
replenish each ship in the unit of ships, except for units with a station ships.
• ARG lift Assets are allowed to travel "light", which means even if there are
only a few items to be transferred ashore, the lift asset will detach. The model
considers an average load to be 30% based on weight.
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• Lift Assets travel unopposed between the ARG and Objective Area.
D. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
This section provides a description of how OSM implements the concept of Sea-
Based logistics. OSM considers an ARG and CVBG operating in close proximity to
support an operation. When ships need replenishment, CLF shuttle ships deliver
replenishment items from a Forward Logistics Base (FLB) directly to the ARG and the
CVBG station ship. A general overview is provided in Figure 3.
The model consists of four components: Set-up and Initialization, Combat, Ship-




Figure 3. Overview ofOSM
1. Set-Up And Initialization
The program begins by setting up a map structure that provides a coordinate
system for all objects. An FLB is generated and given a location on the map. For
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modeling simplicity, CLF multi-product shuttle ships are used throughout, in the
execution of the model. Once generated, these CLF ships are placed at the FLB. An area
of potential hostilities is generated and placed on the map. An ARG and CVBG are
located off the coast of the area of operations (AO). The ARG group contains a set of
organic lift assets, that include a mix of helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, and landing craft
as described in Chapter I. For modeling purposes, the ARG and CVBG remain in the
same position or station during the entire operation. The CLF shuttle ships travel on a
predetermined replenishment route as shown in Figure 3.
2. Combat
For the combat scenario, the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) is positioned deep in
the objective area, and carrying a basic allowance of supplies for 1.5 to 2 days of
operation. The Commander of the Landing Forces (LFC) 2 anticipates that ground forces
will be involved in an assault for the first 3 days of the operation. Afterwards, ground
forces must sustain and hold their positions until ordered otherwise. The combat phase
commences at the start of the simulation clock.
3. Objective Logistics
The simulation begins and ground forces enter combat. Supplies are consumed
based on the usage rates established for the scenario. At the end of each day of combat,
the LFC directs Combat Service Support (CSS) personnel at the objective area to
determine the amount of supplies used in each supply class. If the total amount of
supplies for a particular item falls below 70% of the basic allowance, an order is placed so
as to bring the amount of each item up to 100% of basic allowance. CSS personnel
ashore compute total supplies as the amount currently on-hand plus the net amount of
items already on order.
Commander of the landing force is usually abbreviated as CLF. For this thesis LFC will be used to describe
the Commander of the Landing Force, and CLF will be used to describe the Combat Logistics Force.
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Supply requests from the LFC are passed to the CSS manager who shares a
common office with the ARG Supply Manager on the LHD or LHA. Both supply
managers perform similar tasks to ensure orders received from ground forces are
processed as quickly as possible. The ARG Supply Manager authorizes the removal of
requisitioned items from the ARG ships. When an order is released for issue, available lift
assets will transport the items directly to the ground forces ashore. Figure 4 describes the
flow of information involved in Ship-to-Objective logistics.
Start Here






Send to lift assets
Deploy lift asset
Commander Landing Force
Generate a daily reorder
in terms of supply




Delivers supplies to Obj Area
Returns to ARG when complete
Figure 4. Ship to Objective Flow of Logistics
4. ARG Logistics
As this ship-to-objective replenishment process continues, the LFORM stock
levels aboard the ARG ships quickly diminish. The ARG Supply Manager monitors and
reviews each of the LFORM inventory supply classes of all ARG ships to determine when
to place a replenishment request. Similar to the LFC, when supply levels of a certain
stock item fall below 70% of the stockage objective level, a re-order form is generated.
The re-order form includes the supply line item and quantity of the item to return stock
levels up to 100% of LFORM allowance. After a certain number re-order forms are
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generated, a replenishment request for these items is forwarded to the FLB. The FLB
processes and loads the replenishment requests from the ARG on an available CLF shuttle
ship at the FLB. Once loaded, the shuttle ship(s) proceed along the replenishment route.
Note that these shuttle ships may also be required to service other underway units in the
area. If no CLF assets are available for the ARG, filled orders wait at the FLB until a
shuttle ship asset is available for loading.
When CLF shuttle ships arrive at the ARG, the shuttle ship services each unit of
the ARG and replenishes fuel, ammo and stores. With the ARG ships replenished, the
ARG is capable of maintaining a higher level proficiency in providing service to Marine





CLF Mult-Product Shuttle Ship
Figure 5. Flow of CLF Logistics
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E. SUPPLY CLASS CONSUMPTION PLANNING FACTORS
Combat planning factors for daily supply usage rates of Class I, III, and V(W) are
provided in Appendix C. These particular supply classes were selected because of their




Chapter II and III discussed the development of OSM and explained its
implementation into MODSEV1 II. This chapter presents the results of OSM using two
cases that exercise the features and functions of the model. The results of these cases will
be discussed in terms of the logistical aspects of supporting Marine forces ashore from a
sea-base.
A. COMMON SCENARIO
During the Set-Up and Initialization phase of the model, a map structure of 500 x
350 square nautical miles (nm)2 was established for the placement of the FLB, CLF
shuttle ships, ARG, CVBG, and area of operations. The FLB is located at the vertex of
the map, and all distances to other areas are measured from this location. The following
distances were used during each execution of the model:
FLB => ARG 443 nm
ARG => Objective Area 102 nm
CVBG => Objective Area 184 nm
A mixture of eight lift assets were used to transport supplies to the objective area.
Determining the best mix of lift assets that would satisfy all supply requirements ashore
proved difficult and tedious.
The problem of providing adequate fuel ashore is a recurring topic of discussion in
SBL operations. Before the retirement of the tank landing ships (LSTs), these ships
possessed the capabilities of transferring massive amount of fuel ashore directly to the
Marines of the bulk fuel company. From here the fuel was pumped and stored at large
fuel farms or transferred to motor transport platforms for distribution. Without the LSTs,
the force service support group (FSSG) must provide some means of providing bulk fuel
delivery ashore. Refs. 8 and 10 discuss some of the alternatives to overcome the
shortfalls of depleting fuel stocks ashore in SBL operations.
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From the model, fuel levels ashore reached less than 20% by day two of operations
using CH-53 and VS-22 assets alone, and zero for the remaining days. Since the fuel
requirement was so high, the lift assets were only able to load Class I and V(W), and only
a small percentage of Class III.
For OSM to satisfy the fuel requirement ashore and maintain high levels of the
other supply classes, the mix of lift assets used was modified to include a substantial
number ofLCAC's to allow for greater lift capacity. OSM made an additional assumption
that once an LCAC reached the shore line, other vehicles will need to transport supplies
further inland if the objective area is not at the beachhead.
The remainder of this chapter provides graphical analysis of two model cases. The
first case involves the ARG supporting forces ashore without any external support. The
second case examines the effect of routine replenishments ofARG ships. In each case, the
ARG's ability to sustain forces ashore is discussed.
B. BASE CASE
Assuming that the ARG maintains supplies for 15 days, the Base Case was
exercised for 25 days to estimate when all commodities reach zero levels. Figures 6-11
on pages 22-24, show the ARG and BLT's current level of inventory for each of the
supply classes modeled in this thesis. Note that in each supply class there is a continuous
depletion of stocks from the ARG as these items are being consumed by the forces ashore.
The oscillating behavior on graphs of the BLT represent the current level of supplies on a
given day. Each peak represents the arrival of a lift asset replenishing the forces ashore.
The vertical axis represents the ratio of the number of items currently onhand to the basic
allowance. For example, for class I, this ratio represents the percentage of MRE's
available. Thus with a basic allowance of 8,412 MRE's ashore (2 days of supply), the
ARG is able to maintain Marine forces above 70% up to day 19. Similar results are
obtained for the other supply classes. The sudden drop in BLT levels on day 16 for
classes I and III is explained by the delay in the arrival of a lift asset. With the depletion of
class V(W) supplies at day 15, the lift assets are waiting at the ARG until their cargo
capacity has reached the average load of 30%. Once additional requests are processed
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from the BLT, the lift asset is loaded to capacity and sent to the beach. In practice the lift
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Figure 11. BLT Class 5 Levels (Base Case)
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When comparing all six graphs together, it can be concluded that the ARG by itself is no
longer capable of providing any level of support to the forces ashore after 20 days.
Knowing that contingencies never last an exact amount of time, replenishing the ARG will
assist in planning for uncertainties during the campaign. This leads to the next case, in
which CLF shuttle ships are providing periodic replenishments to the ARG.
C. UNREP FOR THE ARG
As mentioned previously, both the ARG Supply Manager and the LFC desire to
maintain a minimum inventory of 70% at all times in each of the supply classes. To try to
keep the ARG stock levels at or above 70%, a CLF shuttle ship will need to provide a
complete replenishment of needed items for the ARG by day five but not later than day
seven. This determination was made by observing when the class stock levels on the ARG
reach 70%, as clearly seen in Figure 6. Otherwise, the level of support provided by the
ARG to the forces ashore could be jeopardized if the level of combat intensity rapidly
changes.
Applying the replenishment procedures discussed in Chapter II and depicted in
Figure 5, the FLB is able to provide periodic shuttle ship service to the ARG commencing
on day five. Presently, only one CLF multi-product shuttle ship is available to support the
ARG and CVBG, therefore the FLB will load the shuttle ship with items for the ARG only
after all items for the CVBG have been loaded. Once fully loaded, the CLF ship proceeds
along the replenishment route as shown in Figure 3. The results of the replenishments is
given on the following pages in Figures 12-13.
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Figure 17. BLT Class 5 Levels (With CLF Replenishment)
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The " saw-toothed" behavior on the graphs for the ARG represent the arrival of a
shuttle ship. The heavy line is the average inventory level of the supply class and
represents the MOE value to be measured. Several observations may be made about the
graphs. OSM provided the UNREP days for the ARG and CVBG, as well as the times
shuttle ships arrived and departed the FLB. On the average, the ARG received an
UNREP about every 5 to 6 days and the time for the shuttle ship to complete the
replenishment route is about 3 to 3.67 days.
When comparing Figures 12, 14, and 16, the ARG's current level for class 1 fell
below the desired 70% level, even though the other classes received replenishment at day
five. The reason for this occurrence is that the reorder points for classes 3 and 5 occurred
on day 4. Therefore, the FLB loaded the shuttle ship with supplies from these classes
only. The shuttle ship departed from the FLB on day five and completed an UNREP of
the ARG on day six. While the shuttle ship was in route to the CVBG, the reorder point
for class 1 occurred on day seven. When the FLB received the class 1 order from the
ARG, there was not a shuttle ship asset available for loading. As a result class 1 levels fell
to 40%. The next UNREP did not occur until day twelve, bringing class 1 levels up to
70%.
With the shuttle ship maintaining this schedule, given the distances needed to
travel, the ARG is able to maintain the desired 70% of inventory in all supply classes with
the exception of class 1 in the first twelve days. As a result, the ARG can sustain the






OSM is a deterministic modularly designed objected-oriented program that
provided a preliminary look at the logistical implications ofOMFTS, and provided a better
understanding of the relationship between SBL and UNREP. The analysis show that
supporting Marine forces from a sea-base can be achieved with periodic replenishments of
the ARG ships. Specifically it was found that replenishments to the ARG every five to six
days enabled the ARG to meet the demanding supply needs ashore.
B. SUGGESTED MODEL IMPROVEMENTS
OSM can be modified for additional features. Some recommended improvements
are as follows:
• Modify the program that will allow supporting multiple
objective areas. This will allow for studies into the
effect of providing lift assets to support multiple
campaigns at different geographical locations.
• Design an attrition routine that determines the probability
of lift assets arriving at their destination. One suggestion
is to use a Probabilistic Circulation Model. Wayne
Hughes, CAPT,USN(Ret) of the Operations Research
Department at the Naval Postgraduate School is a good
source for researching this topic. See Ref. 22.
Allow the program to distinguish between single product
and multi-product CLF ships. This can assist planners in
determining the CLF requirements for future operations.
Combine the Marine forces supply demand with the
supply demand for ships in the ARG. This can be used to
determine additional levels ofCLF support is needed to
sustain underway units.
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C. POTENTIAL MODEL APPLICATIONS
The disadvantage of using deterministic models in combat is their inability to
capture the intensity of combat. Most tactical combat models provide a greater level a
detail in the attrition of troops and supplies. These daily attrition of supplies can be used
as inputs to OSM. Future researchers may find it useful to merge the characteristics of
OSM with a tactical combat model. These results could provide a more realistic
evaluation of the constraints imposed by SBL and could lead to further studies in the
determination of the level ofCLF support needed for a campaign.
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APPENDIX A. CLASSES AND SUBCLASSES OF SUPPLY
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Reference: FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols figure 6-18
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APPENDIX B. SIMULATION COMMAND AND CONTROL
The OMFTS Simulation Model consists of 14 distinct object classes. A detailed
description is provided below for each of the object modules generated in the model in the




. Main module. Controls simulation time and execution. Creates the
Map Object and starts the simulation clock after all other modules have been
created.
2. MovingObj and PointObj . A MovingObj provides a basic structure for all
objects that move. It contains an instance variable of a PointObj that allows
objects to move from one location to another. The user can input the desired
speed of an object, or of no speed is given, MovingObj will set the initial speed
to zero.
3. MapObj . Establishes a map structure and coordinate control for all objects.
Provides routines for reading input data files. Creates the FLB, Ships, and
Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)/ Combat Service Support(CSS) Area.
4. BaseObj . Contains a PointObj instance variable and characterizes the
establishment of a Forward Logistics Base (FLB) for CLF ships to be
consoled. Processes replenishment requests from the ARG, loads the CLF
multi-product shuttle ships and sets them to sail along the replenishment route.
5. InventoryObj . Uses a record to manage the inventory of supplies for underway




Models any of the 10 supply classes3 . Has similar
characteristics as InventoryObj, but with a greater level of detail. Computes
daily consumption and determines reorder points. Communicates directly with
the CSSEManager on supply shortages.
3 Only supply classes I, IE, and V(W) are modeled in this thesis.
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7. CSSAreaObj . Represents the operating area of Marine landing forces.
Manages a queue of SupplyClassObj's to allows CSS personnel ashore to
monitor supply inventories.
8. C S SEManagerObj . On a daily basis, queries each of the supply class




Manages LFORM for the entire ARG, maintains control
over all logistic lift assets, and processes orders received from the
CSSEManagerObj. The ArgSupplyManager also has the responsibility of
monitoring inventory levels for the ARG and generating and forwarding
replenishment requests to BaseObj for UNREP.
10. ShipObj
. Inherits all the attributes ofMovingObj and PointObj. Contains
routines for shipboard operations, such as move to another destination, unload
and receive cargo, etc.
11. UnrepGroupObj . A queue of ShipObj's that contain CLF shuttle ship units.
12. ARGroupObj
.
A queue of ShipObj's that contain Amphibious ship units.
Contains the master inventory ofLFORM. Provides all routines for the
ArgSupplyManager in the performance of his duties
13. CVBGroupObj
.
A queue of ShipObj's that contain Carrier Battle Group units.
14. LiftAssetObj
.
A moving object that is created and owned by the
ARGroupObj. This object provides the transportation of supplies from the
ARG ships to the Objective Area.
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APPENDIX C. SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS BY CLASS
This appendix provides the daily supply requirements for an entire Battalion
Landing Team (BLT) modeled in this thesis. Sustainment is determined by supply classes
I, III and V(W).
A. Class I Subsistence
Planning factors for Class I is based on a BLT with 1406 personnel. The
requirements for food is based on three meal-ready-to-eat (MRE) packages per man per
day, each weighing 1.47 pounds.
Planning factors for water is 2.5 gallons per man per day based climate and other
tropical conditions. This rate does not include medical and sanitary usage which increases
the daily rate to 10 gallons per man per day. The ARG is usually capable of providing
enough water to forces ashore. Depending on the distance from shore to the objective
area, ground forces can provide themselves with 600 gallons per hour using portable
reverse-osmosis water purification units (ROWPU's). Due to the difficulty of modeling
water replenishment from more than one source to the forces ashore, water consumption
was not modeled in OSM.
B. Classm Bulk Fuel
Based on the components of the BLT listed in Chapter 2, a table of equipment
(T/E) was provided by Ref 8. This information was then passed to I Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) bulk fuels officer (REF. 9) who provided the daily fuel usage for the BLT.
The T/E is given in Table 1 . These quantities of vehicles times the gallons per day
planning factors yields the total daily fuel usage.
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Table 1. Table of Equipment
Equipment description can be found in Ref. 20. The preponderance of the BLT's fuel is
for tracked vehicles, these are denoted by asterisk. F-44 (JP-5) and MOGAS are the two
types of fuels used by the BLT. MOGAS is gradually being phased out of service due to
its highly flammable nature and handling requirements. Since the tracked vehicles, which
use JP-5, have the highest usage, only JP-5 is used in determining Class III requirements.
The assault and sustainment rates are 4772.3 and 3671.0 gallons per day respectfully.
C. Class V(W) Ground Ammunition
The combat planning factors (CPF's) are based on the required LFORM stock
levels for 15 days of operations listed in Ref. 7. The daily consumption rates for ground
ammunition were determined by dividing the LFORM stock amount for a particular
ammunition type by 1 5 days. This number was then doubled to determine the 2 day
amount of supplies carried ashore by the BLT.
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